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Chapter 14 
Migration Control, Citizenship 
Regime, and the Spectrum of 
Exclusion in Turkey 
Zeynep Kaşlı and Zeynep Yanaşmayan 
In November 19, 2016, 123 asylum seekers in Kumkapi Deportation 
Center in Istanbul set fire to their beds and escaped from the center as their 
legal insecurity became insurmountable.1 The maltreatment in the Kumkapi 
Deportation Center had previously been sanctioned by both the European 
Court of Human Rights2 and the Turkish Constitutional Court.3 
Government chose to ignore the issues around legal uncertainty that 
impeded any kind of effective protection and instead responded to the 
overcapacity problems in Kumkapi by increasing the number of deportation 
centers. While the first recorded uprisings and hunger strikes in Kumkapi 
detention center go back to 2009,4 terrible living conditions and prevailing 
legal insecurity are not germane to the deportation center in Kumkapi. 
Recent NGO reports cover instances from 2017, such as the one concerning 
the Harmandali Deportation Center in Izmir, where passersby reported 
hearing screams for help and food and statements such as “this is 
Guantanamo.” There are also serious allegations that asylum seekers in 
these centers are subjected to maltreatment to coerce them to agree to a 
voluntary return, with their access to justice further curtailed.5 Interestingly, 
Harmandali Deportation Center rebutted some of these claims in an internet 
statement by not only denying the accusations of maltreatment, but also 
accusing those who engender such news of being supportive of terrorist 
groups that aim to defame Turkey.6 Their statement reveals how the 
discourse over terrorism and “enemies of the state” prevalent in Turkey, a 
country hosting the largest number of refugees worldwide for four 
consecutive years,7 could so readily be mobilized not only against migrants 
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but also against pro-migrant rights citizens by questioning their national 
loyalty and belonging. 
Evidently, as this volume also showcases, the far-right populist 
discourse that targets and increasingly criminalizes migrants is globally on 
the rise. Studies on right-wing populist parties in Europe tend to see them 
as a divergence from the norm, but at the same time as agenda setters and a 
major challenge to liberal forms of politics.8 One of the major implications 
of the populist anti-immigrant rhetoric has been to bring state sovereignty 
back into center stage in an increasingly globalizing era and make 
migration control an independent site of governance in which, Bosworth 
and Guild’s study of the UK case shows, citizenship and belonging are the 
primary considerations of government.9 Similarly, looking at the overlaps 
among the substance, procedures, and enforcement of criminal and 
immigration law in the U.S., Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration” and 
showed how at the heart of this “marriage” lies the sovereign power of the 
state to define its membership through punishment.10 With varying 
emphasis on the role of discourses, policies, and laws, scholars have 
underlined the state’s expressiveness of sovereign power manifested in its 
desire to both govern mobility through crime and regulate its membership 
through migration control.11 Bosworth and Guild further stress that 
contemporary political discourse is always ready to target the noncitizens as 
a source of potential risk and legitimate their confinement,12 whereas 
Stumpf describes the continuity of exclusion both for migrants whose 
exclusion through deportability turns total and ex-felon citizens whose 
basic citizenship rights are retracted post-confinement.13  
In the Turkish case, migration control, to the extent that it existed, 
has always been shaped explicitly in line with the state’s definition of 
“insiders” and “outsiders” predetermined by the ethnoreligious bias of its 
citizenship regime. Immigrants with “Turkish descent” from Turkey’s 
neighborhood have frequently received preferential treatment, and other 
noncitizens have routinely been criminalized and dehumanized. However, 
as we seek to show in this chapter, citizens also find themselves subjected 
to such exclusion because they happen to fall outside of the limits of 
ethnoreligious membership and the official ideology circumscribed by the 
Turkish state. Therefore, using Weber and McCulloch’s terms, by 
addressing the who of the migration control, the Turkish case does not only 
unpack the category of noncitizens but also shows how it is intrinsically 
linked with the citizenship regime that prioritizes Sunni Turkish and the 
politically loyal majority.14 
What is more, Turkey’s border control measures and related 
cooperation with its neighbors also reveal that citizenship and foreign 
policy tools are heavily intertwined. The prime example of this is the 
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controversial EU-Turkey statement that, in return for Turkey’s cooperation 
on migration control with the EU, led to the EU’s total disregard of 
Turkey’s suppression of its dissidents at home. Hence, Turkey’s 
willingness for such a deal becomes clear only when its migration control is 
examined in relation to the changing power relations in its neighborhood, 
which have implications on state-society relations at home. 
Moreover, Turkey’s migration control, as both citizenship and 
foreign policy tool, and its particular populist tone, are distinguished from 
the populist anti-immigrant movement in Europe. It is a ruling party 
populism that is a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive 
authoritarianism, especially in the developing world in the post–Cold War 
period.15 It is widely agreed that contemporary Turkey has gone through 
such a regime transformation under Erdoğan’s (uninterrupted) political 
leadership since 2002.16 Although neither populism nor authoritarianism are 
new phenomena for Modern Turkey, populism has recently gained in 
popularity as an explanatory force for the peculiarities of the incumbent 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP).17 Among other things, AKP’s populism 
feeds itself from the grievances born from the suppression of Islamic 
cultural references over the course of the twentieth century by the Kemalist 
secular nationalist state and its reformers sitting at the high ranks of 
military and civilian bureaucracy.18 With AKP’s rise to power, virtues of 
conservative Islamic populism as “markers of an ummah-based political 
identity” came to the forefront. However, this did not imply that the idea of 
the “nation” was completely displaced.19 As the incumbent AKP’s neo-
Ottomanist vision of modern Turkey shows, the power of nationhood can 
be conceived in terms of its links to the Ottoman precursors of the 
contemporary state, which plays the game of world politics with the lens of 
a neoliberal state of the twenty-first century.20 The notion of “neo-
Ottoman” historical, cultural, and economic drive was in fact first 
introduced after 1989 to describe Turkey’s involvement in the post-
communist space. However, with the former foreign minister and prime 
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero-problems-with-neighbors” vision, it has 
become the core of AKP’s citizenship and foreign policy. As we argue 
here, this neo-Ottomanist vision also has implications for the border 
regime. This is perhaps best exemplified in the then foreign minister 
Davutoğlu’s following statement: “We do all these with a sense of high 
responsibility as we regard our Syrian neighbors as our brothers and sisters 
with whom we share [a] long history and often a common fate.”21 
Indeed, as of January 24, 2019, Turkey is hosting 3,636,617 Syrians 
under temporary protection, 143,068 of whom are staying in camps run by 
Turkish authorities.22 According to Türkstat data,23 which covers the 
migration trends of 2016, 2017 and 2018, Syria, not surprisingly, is among 
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the five top countries of origin and maintains a steady flow in the range of 
25,000 to 38,000 migrants each year. Yet it lags behind Iraq, which “sent” 
almost triple the amount, reaching into 90,000s, in 2017 and 110,000s in 
2018. Migrants from Afghanistan are also more numerous than Syrians in 
all three years, even if marginally in 2016 and significantly more in 2017 
and 2018 coming closer to 45,000. This could be explained by the fact that 
of the 368,230 individuals registered with the UNHCR Turkey, 46 percent 
are Afghans and 39 percent are Iraqis.24 
Ironically, while Turkey continues to be a source country for 
Europe, be it in terms of professional or family migration,25 following the 
aforementioned coup attempt in 2016, asylum-seeking migration of Turkish 
citizens has also peaked. First-time applications from Turkey, which were 
around the 4,500 range between 2008 and 2015, more than doubled in 
2016, reaching 10,105. It continues to remain at a higher level, with 14,655 
applications in 2017 and 22, 075 in 2018.28 Moreover, very recent Turkish 
statistics provided by Türkstat shows that overall emigration shows a steady 
increase to 323 918 from 253,640 in 2017 and177,960 in 2016.29 Media 
reports support these statistics, often citing an increasingly oppressive 
political atmosphere, safety issues, and reduced job opportunities as push 
factors.30 
Our chapter tackles this intermingling of border and migration 
control with citizenship regime and foreign policy and the ways they 
manifest themselves in an increasingly authoritarian regime. While trying 
to consolidate its economic and political power abroad, especially in a very 
fragile post-communist space, the incumbent AKP has extensively 
capitalized on the old secular-religious cleavage, continued the moralistic 
depiction of politics as a struggle between “us” the people and the 
“enemies” of the Turkish state within and abroad, and consolidated its 
hegemony by winning consecutive elections since 2002.31 Moreover, we 
argue, in the Turkish context, that the (anti-)immigrant position and 
disenchantment with effects of globalization have been shaped through the 
same secular-religious cleavage that has its roots in Turkey’s modernization 
history. In its current form, the government-led populist discourse claims to 
represent the interests of the people to be protected against any domestic or 
foreign “threat” to Turkey’s unity in “one people, one flag, one homeland, 
one state”32 underlined in President Erdogan’s keynote toward the 2017 
referendum, which consolidated change toward the presidential system. 
This imagery of the people sharing the four ideals of unity leads to a large 
outgroup in Turkey composed of seculars, Alevi, Kurds, Westerners, 
LGBTQs, feminists, and even anti-capitalist Muslims who, regardless of 
their nationality, are easily put in a suspect position, demonized, and 
criminalized for defying or challenging the unity of the “New Turkey.” 
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Therefore, what we witness in the last few years is the contradiction 
between the growing number of Turkish nationals fleeing from an 
increasingly authoritarian regime on the one hand and a humanitarian state 
welcoming as “guests” (Sunni) Syrians fleeing the Assad regime on the 
other. 
As the three following episodes depict, this contradiction is not a 
completely new phenomenon in Turkey’s political history. Even though the 
republican ideal in theory promotes a civic identity, Turkish republican 
practice has been quite exclusionary of any ethnoreligious diversity.33 
Hence both minorities and migrants that are not considered part of “Turkish 
descent and culture” have rarely found a place for themselves in the public 
imagination and are easily othered and put in a suspect position. However, 
in the face of the ongoing Syrian conflict and the changing position of 
Turkey in both the regional and global political economy, rising 
authoritarianism and deteriorating fundamental rights have been veiled with 
and legitimized through the aforementioned ruling party populism, which 
expanded the scope of the “outsiders.” The failed coup attempt, in July 
2016, has reinforced this even further, as it legitimized a two-year-long 
state of emergency around a so-called anti-imperialist rhetoric that has 
allowed the incumbent AKP to maintain electoral power by framing any 
political demand as collaboration with enemies of the state from within or 
outside. Islamic populist discourse has also marked humanitarian aid—
again by and for a selected group—as the only legitimate form of solidarity 
with migrants and asylum seekers by distinguishing between deserving 
(read obedient) and undeserving migrants and criminalizing the latter. 
In other words, while populist anti-immigrant discourses have by 
now become very usual in politics in Europe, in Turkey, as we show in 
detail elsewhere,34 it is embedded in long-standing societal divisions that 
continuously polarize and dominate Turkish politics, which in turn facilitate 
the categorization of some migrants as deserving of protection and basic 
rights according to the ethnoreligious cracks in Turkey’s Kulturkampfs, in 
Kalaycioglu’s words.35 These differences in legal inclusion and exclusion 
therefore represent three distinct episodes of migration governance, rights’ 
claims, and legal struggles that run parallel to each other. In the remainder 
of this chapter, we unpack the legal and political conditions that set these 
three episodes. 
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Episode I: Inclusive Exclusion 
through Ministerial Decrees 
Turkey has been a country of emigration and immigration for 
decades. Non-Muslim populations who were forced to leave their 
hometowns since the foundation of modern Turkey, guest workers and their 
families who went to and eventually settled mainly in European countries 
since 1960s, and political asylum seekers who fled from the 1980 military 
coup to different destinations formed the majority of Turkey’s emigrant 
population abroad.36 There have also been various waves of immigration to 
Turkey, mainly of people of “Turkish ethnic descent and culture” moving 
from former Ottoman territories to the “Turkish homeland” who were able 
to acquire residency with a pathway to citizenship by appealing to clauses 
privileging ethnic descent in citizenship and settlement laws.37 
From the 1980s onward and especially since the demise of the USSR 
and the regional political and economic restructuring in the 1990s, Turkey 
has progressively evolved into both an immigration and a transit country.38 
The nationality of migrants and patterns of migration have become much 
more diversified as Turkey attracted circular migration from neighboring 
countries as well as migrants with international protection needs from 
African and Asian countries, all of whom were accommodated in various 
sectors of its informal economy.39 This partly explains why in the Türkstat 
data, the fourth and fifth places for migration flows are occupied by 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in 2017 (around the 20,000 range) and by 
Iran and Azerbaijan in 2016 (around the 15,000 range). 
Despite the growing diversification of mobility to Turkey, its 
migration and minority policies have continued to be shaped through a 
nationalist approach that aims to maintain the “people” as the Sunni-
Muslim majority and selectively includes the newcomers as they fit into 
this ethnoreligious frame. Both the latest 2009 Citizenship Law and the 
2006 Settlement Law maintain the distinction between “foreigner” and 
“göçmen” (denoting Turkish ethnicity) as well as the discretionary power of 
the Ministry of Interior, with the Cabinet as the sole authority deciding who 
would be awarded “göçmen” status. In line with this legal framework, the 
ruling political elite continued favoring migrants of Turkish descent 
(göçmen) such as Turks of Western Thrace, Iraq, Eastern Turkmenistan, 
Afghanistan, and Bulgaria through special regulations, such as the 
confidential addendum to the Cabinet decision 2009/14699 on February 23, 
which granted them a work permit waiver.40 
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This high level of discretion has not always worked to the advantage 
of even the most privileged migrant groups. The changing position of 
Turkish-Muslim immigrants from Bulgaria in the last three decades is a 
good case in point for such capricious ethnoreligious bias. Migration of the 
co-ethnics from Bulgaria have continued throughout the 1990s, the 
aftermath of the democratic transition, because no substantive change was 
foreseen in the economic and political position of the co-ethnic minority. 
Yet, unlike in the previous decades, and despite the existence of 
aforementioned exceptional clauses, Turkey no longer automatically 
granted residence permits through ethnic kinship with a pathway to 
citizenship.42 However, in the first decade of the 2000s, the Turkish state 
offered temporary legalization to this specific group just before elections in 
Bulgaria, with the latent expectation that they would vote in the elections in 
Bulgaria, mostly likely for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), 
the party that by and large represents the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. By 
providing temporary Turkish residence permits, the co-ethnic Bulgarian 
citizens would be allowed to visit their hometowns in Bulgaria without 
having to pay the fine for the days/years they overstayed in Turkey. Hence, 
just like pre-1990s co-ethnic immigrants, political elites have continued to 
maintain special ties with post-1990s co-ethnic immigrants and, through the 
“inclusive exclusion” of the latter, in Agamben’s terms,43 instrumentalized 
its migration policies so as to extend its sovereign power beyond Turkey’s 
territorial borders.44 This signaled a new level of populist strategy that was 
used first in 2001, right before the AKP came to power, and was repeatedly 
used in the following Bulgarian elections over the course of the 2000s. 
Despite the fact that previous policies of immediate inclusion of co-
ethnic immigrants have changed with the end of Cold War politics, people 
of “Turkish descent and culture” have maintained a privileged position 
compared with other migrants with irregular legal status. This has been 
achieved through ministerial decrees, utilized by the ruling political elite as 
both a citizenship and foreign policy tool.45 Their relative privilege also 
reveals that migration governance, even when pursued by populist 
governments, does not frame all noncitizens as potential risks or threats to 
the nation and certainly not all the time. Even more, exclusive inclusion 
may also be an asset to bring political influence abroad. 
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Episode II: Absolute Exclusion 
with Impunity 
As immigrants of “Turkish ethnic descent and culture” have begun 
to hold an ambiguous insider/outsider position, an increasing number of 
other migrants with irregular legal status have gotten stuck in a cycle of 
precarity in Turkey.46 Since Turkey signed the 1951 Refugee Convention 
with a geographical limitation, asylum seekers arriving from anywhere but 
west of Turkey, which constitutes the majority of new arrivals, are not 
considered “convention refugees.” Instead they have to process their 
asylum application through the UNHCR and wait for resettlement in a third 
country. 
From the perspective of the EU’s expanding “remote” control of 
migration beyond its external borders since the 1990s,47 Turkey has 
increasingly played an important role as a “transit” country, obtaining a 
label that was also internalized by Turkish governmental actors and 
bureaucrats.48 For instance, the Turkish Foreigners and International Law of 
2013 was drafted in line with the 2001 and 2003 EU Accession Partnership 
documents and related national action plans for legal and institutional 
transformation.49 Yet, as noted earlier, Turkey’s migration policy has been 
shaped not only in relation to Turkey’s EU membership but in Turkey’s 
changing geopolitical and economic position regionally and globally.50 As 
part of its goal to intensify economic relations, visa restrictions were lifted 
for nationals of various African countries in 2005, while a mutual visa 
exemption agreement was signed with Syria in 2009 with the aim to create 
“Şamgen,” a Schengen-type joint visa policy with Iran and Iraq.51 
Moreover, migration control has again been used as both a 
citizenship and foreign policy tool despite legal changes toward a relatively 
more liberal visa regime. Migrants with irregular legal status have become 
pawns in international and domestic policy. Against the EU’s requirement 
to abolish the geographical limitation clause of the Refugee Convention, 
Turkey has insisted on keeping it until full membership is granted and did 
not easily agree to the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, for which 
negotiations started in 2002 and became finalized in 2013.52 Readmission 
talks were portrayed in Turkish mainstream media solely with reference to 
a visa exemption proposal for Turkish citizens, hence as an improvement in 
their right to mobility.53 There was no mention of how the readmission to 
Turkey would affect non-European asylum seekers, whose only option is to 
become undocumented, in the presence of the non-refoulment principle and 
with no access to asylum or residency in Turkey. However, the 
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“deportability” threat did not apply to all noncitizens and not all the time. It 
was dependent on the whim of the regime, which selectively activated 
deportability, rendering it a political rather than a legal decision. For 
example, in 2010, as a response to discussions concerning the recognition 
of Armenian Genocide in various European parliaments, the then PM 
Erdoǧan declared that 100,000 noncitizen Armenians living and working in 
Turkey are “managed,” meaning their irregular presence is tolerated, but 
they could be deported if relations get tense.55 
The Turkish Foreigners and International Law of 2013 was a step 
forward from the existing fragmented system, which contained secondary 
regulations, bylaws, and circulars, which were repeatedly criticized by 
migrant rights advocates and solidarity groups.56 Based on the 2013 law, 
the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was 
established in April 2014 under the Ministry of Interior to replace the police 
as the main authority and become the primary and centralized civilian 
institution responsible for the whole process of registration, protection, 
detention, and deportation of all migrants. Human rights NGOs expected 
that having such a comprehensive law would help redress problems in 
access to international protection, ensure basic rights of asylum seekers in 
the application process, and overcome the security-driven mentality of the 
police. To the contrary, this law aimed primarily at categorizing regular and 
irregular migration movements with the national interest to better “manage” 
them through a centralized bureaucracy.57 In the initial years of 
institutionalization and centralization, great variations were observed in 
how irregular and/or “transit” migration and asylum processes have been 
managed and experienced in different cities and borders of Turkey,58 at 
times creating local conflicts.59 
Importantly in this episode, irregular migrants have been overtly 
criminalized and subjected to police violence with a prevalent impunity. 
The harsh conditions in custody and detention accompanied by unknown 
detention periods and lack of legal assistance led to uprisings and hunger 
strikes as the vignette in the introduction portrayed.60 We will introduce 
here one nationwide known case of police violence—the murder of Festus 
Okey in 2007 during his detention at a police station in Istanbul—in order 
to give an indication of the criminalization and impunity during this 
episode of migration control. Okey was a Nigerian migrant holding a 
UNHCR asylum application card for resettlement in a third country. The 
police officer, Cengiz Yıldız, who shot Okey, said in his defense that he 
thought Okey was hiding a gun in his shirt. Okey’s shirt was mysteriously 
lost after he was brought to the hospital. During the first hearing in 
February 2008, three friends of Okey, together with the Nigerian 
ambassador, were present but did not dare to demand to be party to the 
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legal action. The Progressive Lawyers Association’s (ÇHD) intervention 
was also rejected with the reasoning that they were not directly affected by 
the crime. According to the ÇHD’s accounts, the defense lawyer’s 
statement offered an example of crimmigration par excellence: “This 
person is not called Festus Okey. He came here with an illegal visa, later on 
he called himself Festus Okey. I wonder, is he a terrorist?” While officer 
Yildiz was suspended briefly from his post, he was not even asked to hand 
over the gun with which Okey was killed for forensic investigation until 
2009. Finally, ÇHD lawyers and members of Migrant Solidarity Network 
managed to reach Okey’s family and requested that his brother, Mr. Ogu, 
be party to the legal action. In the sixteenth hearing in December 13, 2011, 
the court rejected this request and quickly sentenced the police officer to a 
four-year two-month prison sentence for “reckless killing.” The Supreme 
Court of Appeals 1st Penal Chamber decided to overturn this prison 
sentence to have the police officer tried again, while the lower court 
insisted on its decision. On March 27, 2018, eleven years after Okey’s 
death, the Supreme Court of Appeals Sentence Board decided that the 
brother Ogu’s demand shall be considered and investigation shall be started 
again, first by checking the biological ties between Ogu and Okey.61 
In other words, although liberal visa policies make entry easy and 
the new law offers the legal framework for a rights-based approach, 
ongoing geographical limitation to the Refugee Convention and 
exploitation in the informal labor market make access to basic rights and 
above all to justice close to impossible for migrants with irregular legal 
status. The first four years of no action and the last year’s chain of 
decisions and appeals in Okey’s case reveals, on the one hand, how 
migrants with irregular legal status are easily put in suspect positions, and, 
on the other hand, that the general tendency in the Turkish legal system is 
to slow down the process and delay due sentence when the defendant is a 
governmental official. 
Episode III: Exclusive Inclusion 
under State of Emergency 
The mass exodus from Syria has been a test case for the Turkish 
public and its officials in terms of how to legally and emotionally position 
these Sunni immigrants vis-a-vis other international protection seekers. 
Previous conflicts and regime changes in 1980s and 1990s in the region, 
such as the Iran-Iraq War and the first Gulf War, have also caused the 
arrival of many asylum seekers at the borders of Turkey. Although the 
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seeds of the AKP’s foreign policy reorientation toward the Middle East 
have been sown in the Özal era of the late <APOS>80s/early 
<APOS>90s,62 Turkey approached asylum seekers composed of Iraqi 
Kurds and Turkmens more as a security threat and, despite ultimately 
offering shelter, made sure that their stay was temporary even by means of 
creating no-fly zones in conflict areas.63 Turkey’s policy toward mass 
movements from Syrians is similarly shaped by both the government’s 
regional interests and concern over safeguarding territorial integrity and 
national identity, which once again put migration policies at the intersection 
of foreign and domestic policy.64 
Once the civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, Turkey first pursued 
diplomatic channels to convince Assad in a peaceful transition, genuinely 
believing that it could play such a mediatory role in this conflict.65 When 
these efforts failed, Turkey put a halt to the rapprochement policy of 2009 
and radically altered its stance toward the Assad regime in 2011. Turkey 
not only cut all diplomatic ties and economic cooperation, but the then PM 
Erdogan also spoke out in various international and domestic forums about 
regime transition in Syria.66 In the meantime, the open-door policy toward 
Syrians fleeing their country continued. Their arrival was portrayed by the 
AKP government as the living evidence of the atrocities of the Assad 
regime and allowed the government to gain international legitimacy. 
Initially, they lacked a legal framework within which protection claims 
could be assessed, and they were welcomed as “guests,” “a term framed 
and justified in reference to the notion of religious fraternity as well as 
indicating a temporary stay.”67 The legal framework for these Syrian 
“guests” has somewhat improved with the introduction of temporary 
protection status in October 2011 based on an EU regulation,68 putting them 
at a more privileged position in terms of securing basic rights compared to 
other non-European asylum seekers who, according to the geographical 
limitation maintained in the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection, were still not allowed to apply for international protection in 
Turkey. 
The Turkish state’s stance toward the Syrian border has further been 
altered with the realization that the Assad regime would not be quickly 
overthrown and that Turkey would not receive the international support it 
desires for its staunch anti-Assad foreign policy. Moreover, the downing of 
Turkish jets by the Syrian regime in June 2012 and a number of “domestic” 
incidents, most prominently the bombing of the Turkish southeastern 
border town Reyhanli in May 2013 that claimed the lives of fifty-three 
people, increased the fear of a spillover of the conflict. The porous border 
intentionally maintained by the Turkish state in order to exert influence on 
the Syrian armed conflict changed, leading to a period of “gradual and 
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partial securitization” of migration and border governance in 2013–14.69 In 
terms of border-crossers, this implied an unofficial “closed-door” policy, 
although the border remained selectively permeable until mid-2015.70  
Since 2014 the AKP government’s humanitarian discourse via 
brotherhood has become harder to maintain. Turkey began to more 
systematically register Syrian refugees and to raise its voice about 
responsibility-sharing and international aid for accommodating refugees in 
Turkey.71 The flight of Christian and Yazidi Iraqis as well as Kobanë Kurds 
from ISIS assaults disrupted AKP’s narrative of Syrian “guests” as victims 
of Assad’s despotism and revealed the selective nature of the Turkish 
asylum policy.72 Amnesty International reports from that period of time 
show that asylum seekers from Kobanë were detained, questioned about 
their relations to PYG/YPG, and often convinced or forced to return.73 
Similarly, pro-government media reserved its humanitarian approach only 
for refugees fleeing from the Assad regime while turning a blind eye to 
atrocities committed by ISIS on these other groups.74 Given their lack of 
confidence in Turkish authorities, asylum seekers from Kobanë mostly 
refused to take places at separate camps that AFAD had organized and 
preferred to be hosted by local communities of the same ethnic/religious 
origin. Even though the effects of temporary protection status are not yet 
systematically analyzed, it also seems that this status is helping mostly 
Sunni and Arab Syrians to obtain access to rights.75 In October 2014, the 
street protests that were organized in different cities in Turkey to draw 
attention to the atrocities in Kobanë turned into clashes between Turkish 
and Kurdish nationalists in some places, such as Antep, and were 
eventually suppressed by riot police with disproportionate use of force.76 In 
the aftermath of these events, which ended with at least forty civilian 
casualties, the riot police’s right to use firearms was expanded even further 
with the controversial 2015 “internal security package” that restructured the 
country’s law-enforcement agencies, domestic security, and civilian affairs’ 
authorities.77 
Witnessing the side effect of blurring the boundary between 
domestic and foreign political interests, the incumbent AKP has ever since 
made national unity, territorial integrity, and border control its priorities. 
This national unity discourse has brought all opposition, except HDP, 
closer to the AKP’s stance, marginalized Kurdish and leftist HDP and its 
vote base, and eased criminalization of any related groups, citizens and 
noncitizens alike. It also led to “full-fledged securitization” along the 
borders after mid-201578 with the erection of a wall and cross-border 
military action becoming easily accepted by the majority of the Turkish 
public (e.g., Operation Euphrates Shield between August 24, 2016, and 
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March 27, 2017, and the ongoing Olive Branch Operation since January 
2018).79 
Under this political turmoil within Turkey and across its southern 
border, the EU-Turkey Statement was agreed upon on March 18, 2016. The 
deal is built around the 1:1 principle, meaning that Turkey would accept the 
return of all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers whose applications 
have been declared inadmissible or unfounded after a fast-track asylum 
procedure in the Greek Aegean islands, and, for every Syrian returned to 
Turkey, one Syrian would be resettled in the EU. The stakes are therefore 
higher for unauthorized crossers, who are faced with either being deported 
to Turkey, where they would have no access to international protection, or 
would be locked in the islands. 80Although the movement has not stopped 
and the crossings have become riskier and deadlier,81 these conditions have 
deterred a considerable number of migrants from undertaking the journey, 
lowering the number of arrivals to Greek islands from 856,723 in 2015 to 
173,450 in 2016 and to 29,000 in 2017 and 2018.82 
Even though the total number of returns to Turkey remains far below 
EU’s expectations compared with the number of Syrians resettled to the EU 
from Turkey (1,896 to 8,834),83 returns to Turkey began as early as April 
2016. According to the press releases of the NGO Building Bridges, the 
returnees are received under extremely isolated conditions (e.g., blocking 
volunteers from access to persons in the arriving ships) and are cut off from 
all human contact, including legal aid.84 Returnees are directly placed in 
deportation centers, initially often in Pehlivanköy Center, and are veritably 
incarcerated, being held behind bars that are opened three times a day to 
allow returnees access to meals and very short recreation times.85 They 
have no access to internet, phone, or TV, and often are unaware of the legal 
situation that they are in.86 The report of the European Commission states 
that 57 returned non-Syrians applied for international protection in Turkey, 
while 831 of them have been returned to their countries of origin. These 
figures, which are already alarming, might not even be entirely true, as they 
are reported by Turkish authorities and are so far unverified by any 
nongovernmental agency. Additionally, NGOs such as Building Bridges 
and scholars on the ground show how access to international protection has 
been seriously hindered.87 Legal aid is only provided to a few asylum 
seekers who can manage to get in touch with NGOs through personal 
contacts. Extreme legal uncertainty combined with prison-like detention 
conditions reduces returnees to what Agamben calls “bare life”88 to the 
extent that they are rendered not significant enough to be addressed 
publicly by the European or Turkish authorities. 
Things have only deteriorated since the failed coup attempt of July 
15, 2016, and the ensuing state of emergency. According to Amnesty 
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International reports, a series of executive decrees adopted have failed to 
respect even the reduced guarantees left in place under the state of 
emergency, such as the Decree Law of October 29, 2016 (KHK/ 675 and 
676). While there were few instances of forced return of asylum seekers 
and refugees back to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, where they would face a 
high risk of human rights violations,89 Executive Decree 676 has basically 
removed significant safeguards against refoulement from the international 
protection regime in Turkey, extended the categories of foreigners against 
whom Turkish authorities can issue removal orders, and abolished the 
automatic suspensive effect of an appeal against removal orders for 
individuals, including a recognized refugee or a registered asylum seeker, 
who are considered to constitute a “threat to public order, security, and 
health” or are regarded as somehow associated with “terrorist 
organizations.” In such cases, removal orders can be issued even when the 
person concerned is a recognized refugee or a registered asylum seeker.90 
Since late 2017 and early 2018, Syrians who have thus far benefited 
from a comparatively secure legal status have been reported to experience 
hardship in registering their temporary protection status in ten provinces, 
including Hatay and Istanbul.91 Even though Turkish authorities denied the 
suspension of registrations, NGOs report that only pre-registered Syrians, 
urgent medical cases, and babies were continuously registered. There are 
also more instances of refoulement and collective expulsion since 2017 
from the eastern and southeastern border towns close to Syria as well as 
cases of direct deportation of those apprehended at the Greek-Turkish 
border for unauthorized border crossing.92 
The state of emergency in the aftermath of the failed coup and the 
aggressive fight against what is defined as “terrorist” activity put all 
newcomers in a suspect position, swinging the pendulum of victimization 
and criminalization of migrants to the criminalization end. The most 
obvious obstacle for both Syrians and other non-European refugees remains 
the exclusion from the right to citizenship in Turkey; meanwhile, the state 
of emergency executive decrees have extensively limited even basic rights 
of citizens by, for example, withholding the right to mobility of political 
dissidents.93 The deportability of noncitizens, even though the practice is 
against the fundamental principles of international law, reinforces their 
absolute exclusion and makes it easier to completely disregard their 
political subjectivity, political demands, and basic rights. 
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Conclusion 
By looking at the three episodes of migration governance in Turkey, 
we aim to contribute to this volume on populism and criminalization of 
migration by underlining the role of existing ethnoreligious divisions 
underlying a citizenship regime that might go unnoticed in general accounts 
in Turkey. Even though the flows of refugees from Syria since 2011 are 
indeed unprecedented in Turkey’s history, our chapter has sought to situate 
this current migration within the historical and comparative perspective, 
which allowed us to underline continuities and ruptures more clearly. 
Significantly, it has shown how the intertwinement of citizenship regime 
and foreign policy interests has always been part and parcel of migration 
control. While the preferential treatment extended to “Turkish descent” 
migrants from Bulgaria described in detail in the first episode derives 
directly from the state-centric circumscription of Turkishness, which 
despite the official republican ideal is rooted in ethnicity, the open-door 
policy of the pre-1990s as well as the halt of the practice of automatic 
citizenship after the 1990s proves that the open-door policy was equally a 
foreign policy statement to communist Bulgaria in the Cold War era. The 
same lens can be applied to read the Turkish stance for the official 
welcoming of Syrian refugees, as explained in the third episode, which 
again shows the continuity of the amalgamation of foreign policy and 
citizenship regime while governing migration. 
However, the episodes also enable us to demonstrate ruptures that 
came about most significantly during the authoritarian populist rule of 
AKP. Whereas the how of migration control—that is to say, the 
foundational elements of migration control—has not shifted significantly, 
the “packaging” of citizenship regime and foreign policy has gained 
increasingly Islamic undertones. To be sure, AKP has not invented 
populism or neo-Ottomanism; however, it made it a central piece of its 
citizenship and foreign policies. Again, following Hadiz94 this did not 
imply putting an end to the idea of nation, which was predicated in 
“Turkish descent,” but rather adding Sunni majority references that were 
excessively mobilized in the reception of Syrian refugees. Even though 
AKP’s brotherhood discourse did not find as much resonance within the 
Turkish public,95 it was sustained by its hegemony over the parliament and 
the media, which failed to bring about a more rights-based discourse. 
Therefore, the who of migration control has become very significant. While 
some migrants were thus granted protection and rights on the basis of their 
putative proximity to the “imagined community” of Turkey, others, such as 
Festus Okey, who were not part of the national imagination, were legally 
16 
 
disregarded and indisputably criminalized. The second episode shows us 
how the threat of deportability and criminalization is a Damoclean sword 
for non-Syrian and non-Western asylum seekers in Turkey. 
Finally, throughout the episodes, but particularly in the third one, the 
criminalization of migrants along with citizens becomes the currency of the 
day, as Turkey’s regional political and economic aspirations and migration 
control are shaped by AKP’s Islamic populist politics transcending national 
borders. Constant fear of existential threats from within and outside paved 
the way for the imprisonment of all political dissidents, while military 
interventions in the neighboring countries, allowed by the emergency bill of 
September 23, 2017, and recent concerns for political (and economic) 
stability at home put all the new arrivals from the region in suspect 
positions. This is the new height of electoral authoritarianism, which easily 
suspends rights granted by the constitution and protected by international 
law, violates the right to mobility of its citizens and the principle of non-
refoulement for noncitizens, and shows its “benevolent” face only to its 
obedient citizens and migrants who fit into AKP’s national imagery. 
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